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~IA'l'E~lENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages 
for pi_· rsonal injuries allegedly sustained by him in a 
1·a11 through an open trap door on defendants' premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, 
no eause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affinnance of the judgment 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this brief, we refer to the parties as they appeared 
ill the court below. The record on appeal is not numbered 
2 
as pn·scribed by the rules. Hather than munlwri 11g ('<1t·lt 
page separately, the clerk numbered ead1 docutm·nt :o;e
11
_ 
arately. 1'herefore, in referring to the record, we ~hall 
refer to the record page number and, if the <locurn(·nt 
has more than one page, to the page of the docm11("ll: 
(e.g. a refen1 nce to page 2 of plaintiff's complaint wili 
he shown as R. 1, p. 2) The transcript of the trial pr1J-
ceedings is numbered separately. Therefore, in n·feni 11 ~ 
to the transcript, we shall use the de8ignation "T". 
The statement of facts contained in plaintiff;,; Lri1·1 
is not complete, and we deem it necessary to re-state th·· 
facts completely in order that the court may haw ;i 
proper understanding of the background out of which 
this case arises. 
Defendants, husband and wife, operate a restaurant 
and dining room bu8iness located on vVashington Boule-
vard in Ogden. ( T. 16) The place of business is located 
on the west side of Washington Boulevard, facing east-
erly. (Ex:. 1, T. lG, 17) The premises consist of a res-
taurant facility in the front or easterly portion, in which 
counter service and booth service is available; two dining 
rooms in the rear or \vesterly portion of the building: 
with kitchen facilities between the restaurant portion 
and the dining room portion. (Ex. 1) At the time or' 
the accident here in question, there was a parking lot 
for patrons at the rear or west of the premises and l! 
driveway giving access thereto leading off ·w ashington 
Boulevard and along the south side of the building. 
There were sidewalk entrances to the front portion of 
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tll\' l'l'~taurant, but access to the dining rooms was ob-
ta1rwd primarily through an entryway and vestibule on 
tlw ;-;outh side of the building approximately in the 
111id<lk (Bx. 1, T. 41, -1:2) This entryway gave conven-
,,·nt access to both dining rooms, known as the Valley 
i-'orgP l~oom and Fort Pitt Room, to restrooms for both 
mt·n and women, and, if desired, to the restaurant fa-
·· dit it•s in the front of the building. ( T. 20) The men's 
1 p;.;trooltl \\·as loeated near the entryway to the kitchen 
and ju:.st off the vestibule leading to the various dining 
room::;. (Ex. 1, T. 17-20, 43-44) 
Along the north side of the building was a service 
t:orridor leading from the kitchen to the Valley Forge 
Hoom. (T. 19-20, Ex. 1) This corridor was for the use 
of waitresses and other employees in serving food from 
thP kitchen to the dining rooms and in returning soiled 
llishes, etc. It was not designed or intended for the use 
of patrons, since it would require them to pass through 
the entire kitchen facilities in order to reach the dining 
room. (Ex. 1, T. 138, 148) 
The kitchen was at all times well lighted. (T. 37, 46, 
73) The dining room at the opposite end of the corridor 
\ra::; abo lighted, and there was an overhead fluorescent 
light in this corridor in the portion near the kitchen. 
(Ex. 1, T. 2±) Underneath this light there was a stair-
well leading to a storage room where defendants kept 
canned goods, dry vegetables, bottled beverages, etc. 
(T. 24, 197, Ex. 1) Acces·s to the storage area was 
ohtai1wd by opening a trap door and descending by a 
stairwav. (Ex. 1, T. 25) 
At either end of the corridor was a colon•<l \ l'\·d 
or orange) light. ( T. 21, 181, 182, 192, Ex. 1) 'rhe trap 
door was so arranged that upon being opened, the ligfo, 
at either end would start blinking. (T. 182) lt was ab" 
the practice of defendants when the trap door wa, 
opened, to erect a plywood partition to the west 01 
dining room side of the trap door, completely bloekint; 
the corridor, and indicating to employees that the tra11 
door was open. (T. 21) Over the dining room entrane\' t1J 
the corridor was a sign which read '"Employees Unh·". 
(T. 22, 183, Ex. 1) There was also such a sign oYer th1· 
blinking light at the dining room enhance to the eorrid(Jr. 
(Ex. 1, 2; T. 22, 183) 
On the evening of April 4, 1963, the local J ayeet·.' 
\Vere having a banquet and election meeting in the Yallt>y 
Forge Room. (T. 31, 50) One of the Jaycees had 
arranged with plaintiff's employer to furnish a keg of 
beer, and this was delivered to the premises by plaintiff 
at about 5 :30 P.M. on that date. ( T. 55) Plaintiff re-
turned later in the evening to check whether the gas 
pressure was sufficient to maintain the flow of beer. 
(T. 58, 61) According to his version of the matter, the 
usual entryway to the dining room was obstructed hy 
activities of the meeting within. (T. 60) He, therefort>, 
proceeded through the kitchen, down the service cor-
ridor, and into the dining room. The evidence shows 
without dispute that at this time, he had a conversation 
with Martha Lynch, a kitchen employee of defendanb. 
The exact words of the conversation could not, of course. 
be precisely established, but, admittedly, she gave warn-
5 
:ng t() hiw that there was a trap <lour that either "would" 
<>l' "rniµ;ht" be up or open when he returned. 8he did not 
111u1t·atl- to him specifieally where the trap door was, 
11:11 it \\US in<lieated to him, and understood by him, 
1.11a1 it ,,·us in the corridor. (rr. OU, 6:2, 63, 73, 76, 77, 
HU, HJ) 
l'lamtiff had a glass of beer with one of the Jaycees, 
\ tkl'.i\.ed the keg, and then attempted to leave via the 
~1·1·yi .. ·e (~orridor and kitchen. Cl'. 61) When he entered 
1 iw l'.Orndor, he encountered a plywood board obstructing 
1 J1l· passageway. He picked it up, made about a half 
-t1·p or turn, and immediately fell into the storage area 
hvlu\\·, eanying the plywood board with him. ( T. 61, 
'4, 82) 
Two employees of defendants testified that follow-
:ng tlw aecident, plaintiff said he felt foolish for having 
1a1lvn in the trap door after having been warned about 
'b presence. ( T. 138, 18±) This testimony was not re-
ln1tted by plaintiff or by any witnesses on his behalf. 
Plaintiff commenced action against the defendants 
11\· t·omplaint filed June 22, 1964. (R. 1, p. 1) In his 
l'.Olllplaint, plaintiff alleged as grounds for recovery var-
111ns itt>1w; of claimed negligence, namely: (a) failing 
tu loek the entrance door while the trap door was open; 
1 Li) failing to provide an adequate barricade around the 
trap door; ( c) failing to give indication to the plaintiff 
,J! thP location and danger created by the trap door; and 
1d1 failing to elose the trap door after use by defendants' 
<tµ-Pnts. ( U. 1, p. :2) By their answer, defendants denied 
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negligence on their own part, (R. 3, pp. 1, 2) and as an 
affirmative defem;e alleged that the accident was uiu~\·d 
solely by the negligence of plaintiff, or that plaintitr 
was guilty of contributory negligence. (R. 3, p. ~) Di~­
covery proceedings were conducted by both partiel:l and 
on K ovember 15, 1965, the case came on for pretrial 
before Judge Cowley. At the pretrial, plaintiff daiiued 
the same grounds of negligence as alleged in hi:; corn. 
plaint, and further claimed that the trap door wa:s a 
nuisance. (R. 15, p. 2) Defendants again denied an; 
negligence and re-asserted plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence as a defense. (R. 15, p. 2) The concluding para-
graph of the pretrial order provided as follows: 
"IT 18 FlJRTHER ORDERED that no amend-
ments be permitted to the pleadings heretofon· 
filed or to this Pre-trial Order except fur good 
cause shown and to prevent manifest injustice." 
(Emphasis ours) (R. 15, p. 3) 
The pretrial order was prepared by counsel for the plain-
tiff at the direction of the court. (R. 14) 
On these issues, the case came regularly on for 
trial before Judge Cowley on December 13, 1966. (R. 1~. 
T. 4) All evidence offered by plaintiff and unobjeeted 
to by defendants was relevant to the issues as defined in 
the pleadings and pretrial order. At the conclusion ol 
plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff's attorney, for the fir~t 
time in the case, moved to amend the complaint and 
the pretrial order to allege as an additional theory of 
recoverv that defendants were guilty of wilful miscon-
duct. ( T. 177, 178) The motion was resisted by defend-
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;int:- 011 tl1t~ grounds: first, that there was no evidence 
JH th,• n·t·ord which would support a finding of wilful 
'111H·o11Juct; and secondly, that the motion was untimely 
l ill·(L On both grounds, the motion was denied. ( T. 178) 
'i'lll' rnotion was renewed at the end of all of the evidence 
and, again, denied on the same grounds. (T. 202) 
Although defendants had contended that plaintiff 
\Ya~ a tres1>asser or, at best, only a licensee as to the 
tiortio11 of the premises on which the accident occurred, 
the· court held as a matter of law that he was in the 
,tatus of a business invitee, and that defendants owed 
l.J lum ::;uch duty of care as would be owed to any busi-
Jl(•:-:.-: invitee. (R. 23, pp. 7, 8) The case, therefore, was 
~nl1111itted to the jury on the issues of defendants' negli-
gence and plaintiff's contributory negligence, (R. 23) 
<lllJ after due deliberation, the jury returned with its 
gPill'rnl verdict in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action. (R. 24, T. 209) 
Plaintiff's sole ground of appeal is that the court 
dl·nied his motion for leave to aniend and to include 
as an additional ground of recovery alleged wilful mis-
condud on the part of defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
1'hl' trial judge denied plaintiff's motion for leave 
to amend both on the grounds that there was no sufficient 
evidence to warrant submission of the issue to the jury, 
and on the ground that it was untimely made. If the 
judge was correct on either ground, the judgment below 
111ust be affinned. 
8 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
WARRANT THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF 
THE ISSUE OF WILFUL l\IISCONDUCT. 
Plaintiff contends that the jury could have found 
that defendant::::; were guilty of wilful mi::::;conduct in 11iarn 
taining "an unguarded trap door opening" "in an unli:. 
passageway" and that plaintiff could '"see no ::::;ig-n~ ur 
warning devices,'' and that plaintiff ''had no rea::;uH t11 
suspect the existence of such danger." (Appellanf::; Bril{ 
p. -!) ~one of the::::;e contentions are supported by tlw 
record. \Vith respect to the claimed unguarded tra11 
door opening, the evidence shows without di::::;pute that 
the opening was guarded by a plywood sheet, approxi-
mately the size of a cross section of the corridor, ~et 
in front of the trap door and thus giving notice that 
passage was occluded. This was recognized in the open-
ing statement of counsel for the plaintiff. ( T. 7) It wa~ 
also repeatedly testified to by plain tiff. ( T. Gl, 7-!, SU. 
81, 82) Defendant Lon Rothey, and Martha Lynch, a 
former employee of defendants whose testimony wa~ 
offered by the plaintiff, testified to the same effect. 
(T. 21, 140) 
\Yith respect to the claim of an unlit passageway, 
there was uncontradicted testimony by defendant Lon 
Rothey that there were overhead fluorescent lights above 
the trap door. (T. 24) Plaintiff's witness, Gary Nelson. 
testified that it was not dark in the passageway and that 
the h.'itchen was alwavs real well lighted. (T. 37) He 
nt>ver had any diffic~lty getting through the corridor 
even with the partition up. (T. -!5) The kitchen end 
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\\(•uld lw lig-htL'd uy light from tltt~ kitdtl'll. (T .. !()) Plain-
;i1'!":-i '' 1tm•ss Brown te::;tified that he ha<l no difficulty 
:.:•·l t inc:· down the <.'.orridor, although he ha<l no particular 
1 ,., (llkdion of the light::;. ( T. 55) Plaintiff himself testi-
1 i1·d that thL' kiteltL'n wa::; well lit and that lights from the 
io<'111;-; on l'itlH·r end of the corridor shown down the cor-
r:do r. ( T. 73) Although he ha<l no recollection of lights 
11 tlt1· pa:::-sagt>way, (T. 7-l) he had no difficulty in seeing 
al11n.g the hall. (T. 80) 
\\"ith rL•spect to plaintiff's daim that there were no 
,.;,;us or warning devices, there was clear and pm;itive 
·I ~timony uy defendant Rothey and by his employee 
:-;[i;·nrnod that there were warning lights in place at 
•• 1tlt\'1· en<l of the corridor, and that there were "Em-
ployees Only'' signs at the en<l of the corridor, all of 
"' hid1 ·were in place and readily visible on the evening 
1Jf the aeeident. ( 1'. 21, 22, 23, 181, 182, 183, Exs. 1, 2) 
_\lthonglt the witness Nelson testified that he never 
ol1:'erYed signs or warning lights (T. 36, 46) he would 
Lilt dL·ny that sud1 warning8 were present and admitted 
that tht>y could have been present without his having 
ul1:'Prwu them. (T. 47) Likewise, the plaintiff, although 
l1:l\ ing no re<.'.ollection of seeing the warning signs or 
:lashing colored lights, (T. 61, 73) readily admitted on 
('I u:':-; px.arnination that such signs and flashing lights 
111i1-d1t haYe been in place without his having observed or 
rL·c·alled them. ( T. 80, 85) 
Counsel's a8sertion that plaintiff had no reason to 
~us1wct danger must have been made with tongue in 
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cheek. The record is replete with testimony of a convi·r-
sation between plaintiff and defendants' then employ\'(·, 
Martha Lynch, regarding a warning of a trap door in tli" 
corridor. Again, in his opening statement to the jun. 
counsel for the plaintiff adverted to this fact. (T. Gi 
Plaintiff himself testified that Mrs. Lynch said, ··r may 
have a trap door up," (T. GO, 63) Elsewhere, he testifir.d 
that she said, "There may be a trap door," (T. 73) and 
"I may have the trap door open." (T. 76) On cro~~ 
examination, when his attention was called to his testi 
mony on deposition, wherein he testified that .Mrs. Lync·l1 
said, ''I'll have a trap door up," he admitted that he wa~ 
not certain whether she said, "I will," or "I may" have a 
trap door up. (T. 77) That he was conscious of th1 






Now as you proceeded up that passagL·way. 
were yoii conscious of this injunction tlial 
there might be a trap door up? 
Yes. 
And what, if anything, did you do as a re:::ult 
thereof? 
I was watching to see where I was goinr 
and I moved the board to see if it U"as !1t-
hind there, and it was." (T. 7-±) (Emphasi~ 
ours) 
Mrs. LYnch's testimony was to the effect that she told 
him the trap door was there and that it was dangerou~. 
( T. U-0) According to the uncontradicted evidence of 
two of defendants' employees, plaintiff said after the 
11 
·""1d1·11t that !iv l'dt "foofo;h" and "ernbarra::s:sed'' at hav-
11.: i'alll'lt in tlte trap door al'h·r having been warned 
· t 1 ('I'. 1'~", 1u ') :1ll<i\I 1 ~ preSl'lll'.l', ~u ".I: 
ln :-;upport of his claim that the evidence would 
-1tppnrt a finding of wilful misconduct upon the part 
,,\ d\·LPndanb, plaintiff relies principally upon the A.L.l. 
f,' .,/<1!1111c11t uf tlw Law uf Torts '2<.l, f::Jcction 500. This 
:-1l't1011, lto\\'cYer, refers to "reckle:s:s disregard of safety'' 
1 atlt1·r t lm11 "wilful misconduct.'' ln a :scope note pre-
,., di Hg tlus :section, the authors explain that the distinc-
:101, lict\n:en reckless and merely negligent misconduct 
'·' made comparatively unimportant in the Restatement 
-1Hl'I' the Institute adopts the view that a possessor of 
iand o\\ es the same duty of care to a known trespasser 
01 li('l'n:see a:s he would owe to a busine:ss invitee. That 
:-:l'opt· note reads as follows: 
"~eope Note: The distinction between reckless 
arnl mt>rely negligent misconduct is made com-
paratively unimportant in the Restatement of this 
.-;ubject, with respect to the duties of a possessor 
of land to those coming onto the premises, by 
tli1· fact that the Institute has adopted the view 
that a posses8or of land owes the 8ame duty of 
rnrd'ul action toward a known trespasser or a li-
c·1·n::sP1.' a8 he would owe had the same situation 
arisen in a plaee in whieh both he and the tres-
pa:-::-:Pr or licensee had an equal right or privilege 
or ah:-:eneP of right or privilege to he. (See §336) 
I l<rn-Pw'r, there an' many jurisdictions in the 
l'nitPd StatPs whPre a possPssor of land has lwen 
~aid to be liable to a known trespasser or gratui-
ton;:; lieensPe only if he has been !:,'1lilty of 'wanton,' 
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'wilful,' or 'reckle::;s' mi::;con<luct toward the 
111 
.. ,_ 
passer or licensee." 
:::;ection 500 was designed primarily to take care of thi"' 
jurisdictions where a lesser standard of care i8 n·quin·d 
of a possessor or owner of land toward a known tlh-
passer or licensee than to a business invitee. rrhi8 would 
appear to be of no importance in l:-tah, where thi:s eourt 
has previously held that there is a duty to warn a kno11 11 
trespasser of a danger of which the owner has knowledlr1. tJ 
and has reason to believe the plaintiff will not di:scover. 
M.artin v. Jones, 122 Ut. 597, 253 P.2d 359. In that cast:. 
this court adopted the rule of Section 337 of the He-
statement of the Law of Torts. In view of the fact that 
Utah has adopted a rule of due care toward known tres-
passers, and in view of the further fact that the trial 
judge treated the plaintiff as ·a business invitee in thi~ 
case, ruling out defendants' claims of trespasser or li-
censee, there was no occasion for application by th~ 
court of the rule of Section 500. 
Moreover, that section in itself provides no preci~1· 
definition of ''reckless disregard of safety" much les~ 
"wilful misconduct." It does indicate, however, that the 
risk "is substantially greater than that which is necessan-
to make his conduct negligence." In this ca::;e, there wa~ 
a very serious question as to whether defendants wer~ 
even guilty of negligence, conceding arguendo, that plain-
tiff was an invitee whose presence should have been 
anticipated at the place where the accident occurred. 
There can be no doubt that defendants had taken some 
precautions to make the passageway safe by the use of 
13 
, :11 111 u:..: l 1gli b aml :-;ign::; and tl1L· L' rl'dion of a lmrrit<tde. 
1 11111Td1ng that a jury might iind that these precau-
,1111:- \1 l·n· not rl'a::;onable or adequate under the circum-
,!.111tT:', it is difficult to ::;ee uvon what ground a jury 
111i·l ;'iml that defendant::; were wholly unmindful or 
, 111qilt h·ly 1ndiffl'l'l'nt to the ::;afety of user::; of the pa::;::;-
"~1·11 a: ill YiL•\\' of the vreeaution::; which the evidence 
·i11·\1 :- 11 itl1out di:-01rnte had been taken. 
l'lallltit'f relies heavily upon the \\'a::;hington ea::;e 
1 1,,,, /1111 c. 8ulu11w11, 287 P.:2d 7:21. This is the only 
;t:-1· \ i1it'l1 our researth disclose::; wherein a pos::;essor of 
ia11d lia:- IJ1'L'l1 held liable upon the grounds of wilful 
1 1i~1·111J(lll<·t. lt may be noted parenthetically that there 
. :111 1·:\11·11:.:ive annotation in GG ALR :2d, conuuencing at 
1 .1~1· ;;;;:i. on the subject of falls into stairways, trap 
il.111r:-, 1·k. Although this annotation occupies some one 
'1il111in1il L><WL'ti there is not a sino-le case therein cited 
b ' b 
.. 1· n·p111'ted wherein the theory of recovery was based 
ltjlllll \\ ilfnl misconduct. rrhe only theory relied upon by 
:111.\· ol' thL· plaintiff::; in the cases there reported, other 
tl1a11 1wo-li"·pm·v wa::; that in a cou1)le of cases plaintiffs 
r-"' r ' 
1"ii1·d upon ··::;afe place" statutes. 
g,. that a::; it may, the Gn·etan case is ::;o different 
1 11 1t.-- fact::; from the case at bar as to be of no persuasive 
.tllthorit: in this case. The principal finding of fact of 
t 111 trial vonrt in that case was finding YIII, as follows: 
.. \'I I I. Dd<>ndanb admit in thPir Anl"W<'r and the 
l '(>mt l'ind8 that tlw PXC'avation at thf' time in 
i:-;:-w· wn:.: op<>n and lmrovpn•d, irithout signi'.i, 
ii.r1/1fs 11r 91wrds 11ro1111d it. and the Court furtlwr 
l'iud:-: from the evidt.•nvl' that dcfe11da11ti'.i mode no 
14 
effort tu warn lJl·a·intiffs the G·nl)(•t·. . 
• • • • • ' • < ~, (Jl a1, 
other t:nants of theu· mtentton to PxeaYat(· ,,' 
of the fact that the excavation had aetualfr Ii\·, 
started. rfhe COUrt further finds that dejc;li/ L 
• • 1/11/. 
gr:ve n~ instructwf!s to George icith ref;ard . 
signs, lzghts, warn1.ngs or other safef;1wrds "' . 
that no such safeguards u·cre in fact takeu. IJ 
fendants had pro·vided no lighting i11 the <ii· 11 , /.i 
area and no light u:as providc.d from 
0
u11fs 11 i. 
sources. At the time plaintiff wife ~ustai1wd Ji, 
fall, the back yard generally and the place uf en 1. 
vation particularly were in complete darkiu·:~,. ai
1
,, 
the plaintiffs did not knu1r and had 1w rca.-011 ; 
know of the existence of the exca1;atio11.·· (Eu' 
phasis ours) 
The italicized portions of the above quote readily de11w1, 
strate the differences between the facts in the G rt>etm 
case and in the case at bar. 
The other case heavily relied upon by plaintiff 1~ 
Busy Bee Buffet v. Ferrell, (Ariz.) 310 P.2d 817 Tlwi 
was not a case of reckless or wilful misconduct at all. 
Plaintiff proceeded against two separate defendant! 
upon the grounds of negligence, and a conflict aro~t 
between the two defendants concerning primary and 
secondary liability. One defendant had beeen guilty 01 
active negligence in creating a danger to the plain· 
tiff. The other defendant was guilty of merely pa~~in 
or static negligence in failing to discover or remove th1, 
danger. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the 
defendant who was merely passively negligent was en· 
titled to indemnity from the defendant whose negligenl'1 
was active. Said the court: 
"* * * \Ve believP "'"' should now discuss briefh 
the difference between the character and kind 111 
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11,.; . .d i;.•y1H·1· or th1· Huffl't and that of Pastis. The 
t1·rn1 'di l"t'n1•JHT in kind and eharadt>r' lwtwPell 
1 li1· 111·glig-1·11cP or thP Buffd and Pa:-:ti:-: lllust not 
IJ\' 1·1'11l'u:-1·d ,,·itlt \·u1u1mratin· 11Pgligt•nce' or '<le-
~T1·1·:-- 1Jf m·gligt·iwt•.'" 
• • • 
"\\'1· 1"i11stntl' thP Y\•rdiet as n•rHl\'rPd as a finding 
!1.' tli1· .inr>· that lioth the lfoffd w1d Pastis w1·n· 
11• .11/i1}"J1f and both wen• liahh· to Ft•JTPll in tlw 
1·1i1 I ;111w1111t of tlw Yl'rdiet, and that Pastis wa.-; 
pri11wril>· Iiahl(~ and tht• Buffrt s\•(·ondarily liahh·, 
and tliat the· Buffot was Pntitlt'd to intlPnmity as 
again . ;t Pastis.'' (Ernphasis ours) 
!'Iii:- i:-; \':--~wntially the same type of case and involve::; 
ti1•· ,a1111· principal as wm; recognized by this court on 
-1111tln1 i'ads in the case of Salt Lake City u. 8chuhach, 
111, I :. :.!li!i, 1S9 P.2d 149. 
ThL· l 'tah cases of Wood v. Taylor, 8 Ut.2d :no, 332 
1'.~d :21.-l; /'1 rg11.':ioll c. Ju11gsma, 10 Ut.2d 179, 350 P.2d 
-tll-t; arnl State l". Berchtold, 11 "Gt.2d 208, 357 P.2d 183, 
<rn· not hl'lpful here. All of them are automobile cases 
\1·ltoll~- Jiffnent on their facts. \Vood v. Taylor was 
d(•('idl'd nnd('l' the Idaho guest ,statute, and tlw issue was 
'-1 hdlt1·r thP defendant was guilty of "reckless disregard" 
for plaintiff's safety within the meaning of the Idaho 
la\\. ~tat\• v. B\•rehtold was a crim.inal case. The case 
,,t· Lorsui1 1·. Calder's Park Cu., 5.f. Ut. 325, 180 P. 599, 
<l;~u quotl·d hy plaintiff, wa:s decided on a negligence or 
nui:--nn1·1• tlwory and not upon a theory of reckless or 
'>' i If 1 d 111 i :--•·on<lnet. Tlw otlwr C'asl's c·i t(:ld and relif'<l upon 
Ii~ 1ilaini ff. n<llll\'ly, Senner c. Da11e1wld, (Ore.), 7 P.2d 
~-t\J: C/1(11/(c r. Lmcry's Inc., :2-t Cal. Rptr. 209, 3H P.2d 
Hi 
185; and Rossiter v. Moure (\Vash.) 370 p .y.1 ·»ti. 
' ' ·-U -J d!1 
all negligence cases, sii11ply holding that the t·vidL·I!,,, 
of negligence in the particular case was sufiirn·nt ti 
warrant a jury finding to that effect. These cas1._'s Ju ai. 
support plaintiff's contentions here. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
WAS UNTIMELY IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY AXD 
BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE. 
As we have heretofore noted, the plaintiff toll!· 
menced this action on a theory of negligence. All Ji~. 
covery proceedings were conducted upon the ua::;is 111 
that theory. The theory was re-asserted at the pretna1. 
At the time of pretrial, all discovery proceeding::; ha11 
been completed and plaintiff's counsel then had availaoi1 
to him, and knowledge of, all of the evidence that wa~ 
available to prove his case. In all fairness to the dt-
fendants, they should have been advised at that time ii 
plaintiff intended to rely upon any theory of wiliu'. 
misconduct or any theory other than those already st1 
forth in the pleadings and pretrial order. Even at th1· 
outset of the trial, plaintiff's counsel did not advise tht 
court of his intention to seek an amendment to his cow· 
plaint. Cross examination of plaintiff's witnesses at 
trial was conducted on the assumption that the c~1 
was being tried on a negligence theory. 
Had the plaintiff's motion been granted it would haw 
been necessary for defendants to amend their answer and 
to allege the def ens es set forth in Section 503 of th" 
Restatement of Torts 2d. It would also have been nece~· 
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-: 11 .. l 11' d1·1·1·11dants to st•t·k a eontimuuiee to agam 
, ,.\ 11·11 1 IL(' nwt t1·r \\·ith all witlll':"St•s and to dett>n11ine 
:1·.t ;,dd1tio11al 1·\·idt·rn·t· \\ould have to lw offered in 
.. ,[, ,. t1l 1111•\·t thP new theory, All of this would eertainlv . . 
;1" i1t!l·1 l1·1·l·d \Yith a "slH'l'UY and i1wxpensive" trial of 
I"· :le-". 11 !1 iclt is mH· of thl' puq)()Sl'S to be served by tlw 
'.;II: [(Ull':". lfo/(· 1, C.R.().P. 
11 111ak1ng his motion, eounst•l for the plaintiff of-
,, d 1111 ,·xplanation or justifieation for his tardiness 
.11,,l. 111d1·1·d, lw eould have had none. The obvious pur-
,, "' · "1· t l1l' uianeuv<'r was to seek hy surprist' to <lt>lH'ive 
, 11·11tla11t:- of one of the defenst·s upon whieh they most 
.-i:,H1; .. ;l~ n·liPd, nanwly: negligt'nee upon the part of 
! .. plainti!T. Jn fad, under the holdings of this court 
,., A Jl·I!' , • i"ill<Jll', lHl L'.t. 522, 229 P.2d Si-±; Tempo;t 1:. 
/!1c/1i111lsu11, .-> l"t.2d 17-t, 299 P.2d 124-; Wood i:. Wood, 
"' l 't.:2d :27!J, :l:l3 P.:2d G:30; JI ('!try u. H' ashiki CluJJ, Inc., 
1 l l 1.:211 i:;~, :l:->5 P.2d 973; and 1Vhitma11 1:. W. 1'. Grant 
! •) .. 1 li 1 · t .:2<1 ~ 1, :l~J;J P.:2d 918, it is difficult to see how 
1 la,11tifl' <·onltl havP avoidPd a holding as a matter of law 
1i1a1 ltl' ,,·as guilty of contributory negligence. 
l'lainti!Ts motion for leave to amend must be justi-
; 11 d. 1 f at a 11, urnlPr tlw provisions of part ( b) of Rule 
,."1. { .H.( '.!>. This provides, insofar as material here, as 
I J 'l 1 (I\\' :-i : 
"I !11 .\11ll'rnhw·nts to Conform to the EvideneP.-
\\'l1t<11 issrn•s not raisPd hy tlH' plt>adings arf' tried 
i!I/ ,. , J,,.r·ss or i111JJ[i('(l co11sl'nf of the partiPs, they 
:-l1all i,,. t n·at(•d in all rPSJH'<·ts as if tlwy had been 
rai:-1·d in tlw plt·mling:-. " "' " If evidence is ob-
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jL·_cte_d to a~ the trial on tlw ground that it 1 ~ 1,,, 
w1thm the rnsues rna~e by the pl<>ading:..:, th(· ,.
11
\: . 
may allow the pleadmgs to be amendPd \\'hPn ,, 
presentation of the merits of the adion will i. 
su~served thereby and the objecting party foil.-, 
satisfy the court that the admission of :..:ul']1 , \ de~ce would pn•judice him in maintaining L. 
act1011 or defense upon the merit::s. • " *'' 1 J'· 
phasis ours) " 
\Ve have no lJ.Uarrel with the general prupo:-; 1111 ,, 
asserted by the plaintiff, and the authorities cited .. 
support thereof, to the effect that amendments shall !· 
freely allmved to "conform the pleading to the evi<lem1" 
"to accomplish substantial justice'' ''when the intere~t 1.1: 
the adverse party will not be unfairly prejudiced," 1J1. 
However, that is not this case. There were no i$~\JI.· 
tried in this case "by express or implied consent" of tl1· 
parties other than those defined in the pleadings a111: 
the pretrial order. All of the evidence off erd by tL1 
plaintiff was relevant to the issues of negligence <m'. 
contributory negligence. Any evidence of wilful miseon· 
duct, if any such had been available to the plaintiff. 
would have been objected to as irrelevant, innnater~al. 
and beyond the issues of the case. By its plain langual:'1 
the provisions of Rule 15 (b) are not applicable here .. t 
noted in 3 Moore's F!!deral Practice 997: 
"It has been held, however, that a court has pow1 
to reject an amPndnwnt off Pred at or aftN tna 
purportt>dl~· to eonfo11n to PYidenee, if the oPJl1•1' 
ing party will be prejudiced thereby, or the tna 
unduly delaved." . . 
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, ,,,,1 i1d (111! 11.\ tlti:-: <'Ollrt Ill fll11ckl111111 1 . • '\111·!!1ro1·1 • 
,I!.-,~. :_>:II l'.:2d -i.;1:l, thl 1 p11rpo:-:1• of p]Pading:-: und\'J' 
1., I" \,, ··,,:i\·1· tlH· oppo:-:ing party fair noti<'I' of th1· 
::,:: 11 · 11;1,i:-: l1r ground:-: ol' tlH· (']aim." \\'(' abo invitl' 
11 ·It !" tlw ln11gung1• of' thi:-: c·oHrt in th1• ea:-:1' of 
\,. ,.,,i1/ 1·r1r111, ,._, l ·11i()11 J>roJJ. &: ('as. Co. r. Tlw111psu11, 
1 .. 'd , . ~"-Ii l'.:2d :2-l-!l, ,,·Ji1·n· th1· eourt :-:aid: 
.. \,>111 ,; l1,.;1<1111li11.!: all ol' onr 1•t'f'ort:-: to dimi11at1· 
1., l1ni,-;lii1i(·c- a11d lilH·rnliz1· proePdl!n', w1· rnu:-:t 
11 111 J,,,,, c-i_! .. dtt ol' th1· c·ardina] pri1wipl1· that undc·r 
··Iii :--\ :-:t1·111 ol' .iu:-:tic·I', if an i:-::-:\11' i:-: to hi' tril'cl 
::11 I :1 :1:111~ ':-:right:-: 1·orn·IHdPd \\ith n·:-:1H·l't tlll'n·-
111. i1 1 11111,f /11/{'1 lllific1· fllt'/'t'IJj (Ill(/(/// OjJjJO/'fllll-
1 ' 11111 f it. This i:-: n•1·01-,rniz1•d in Hui<' l;)(h) 
• 11i1·l1 1·1·<'it(':-: tl1at S\\('h lihnal arn1•1Hl111l'nts ;-;hall 
111· :1ll1r1\(•d if th1• i;-;:-:rn· i;-; tril·cl 'hy 1•xpn•:-::-: or i111-
1·l:1,,] 1·1>11:-:(•nt of th1• partil':-:.' It d1w;-; not appPar 
: l1<1l i lwn' \1·a;-; a11.Y :-'U('h 1·011:-:1·11t to try th1• i;-;:-:111· 
11' t '.i(' Yalw· of' thi;-; huilding ..... n, (Emphasis 
Ollf::') 
1[_,,, q1111110:-: Ii('](' is th1· languag1• of this eourt in the 
';1,1· of 'l1111lor 1. /.,'. JI. Ruyle Curp., 1 l't.:2d li5, 26-1 
l'.:.'.d ~19: 
•• 1 t i.-... 1 nt1· that om 111·1r rull·s shoul1l lw •Jill<'rally 
1-.111:--fr111·d· to s1·1·11n• a ·,j11:-:t •"' • d1•t1·r111ination of 
, .. , , r:· ad ion' l>11t tl11·~- do not J'(•pn·;-;l'nt a 0111•-way 
-! 11·1·t <lll\n1 \1·hiC'h hut 0111· litigant Illa~- trav"I. 
Tl1 .. rnl1·s allow 10(·1·0Jl10ti011 in hoth din·l'tion:-: hy 
;111 111t1·n""t1•d trav1•l('J'.". 'l'h1·y allow plaintiffs eon-
:--id1·ralil(• latitudl' in pll·<Hling- arnl proof, to tlw 
1 111int 11·lt1·n· :-:011tl' IH'opl<· ha\"!' 1•xpn•;-;;-;1•d th1· opin-
i1111 1 l1at 1·ar<'ll1 :-:s ](•gal (']'af't:-:rnan:-:hip ha:-: !Jl'Pll 
i11Yil«d ratlil·I' than di:-:1·011rn.!:l'd. B1• that as it 
•:1:1:-, 11 1/1 (1 111la11l 11111sf !"· 1 Yf1·11dcd cury rl'asun-
:.JI 
·(J;ble opzwrt1wity to prepare his case 1111d to 
111
, 
an °:dversar.1/.~ claims. Al:so he nwst ur jJ/'olt c; .. 
~tgaznst ~·1irp!·1sc a11d uc assured CfJIWl UJ!JJur/,,, 
ity (~nd jaczl1ty to present a11d prucc co1111/1r ci,, 
tentwns, - df:w unilateral justiee and in.itbiir· 
would result suffici<>nt tu rai::se :wrious doubt~ :i· 
to constitutional due proces::s guarankes.'' ( t-: 111 
phasis ours) 
The language of the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap)ll«ti· 
in the case of Sims i.:. Andre1rs, 118 F.:Zd 803 is imrti1 11 
larly pertinent here: 
''It is ordinarily within the sound di::scretion of ::1• 
trial court to permit an amendment to confur1 
to the proof where evidence has been intro<lut·1.,'. 
without objection as to facts not presented, .I! 
insufficiently presented, by the pleadings. Th, 
right to amend pleadings to conform to the Jll'U1• 
proceeds upon the theory that by such amend11H·11: 
the pleadings are brought in line with the actua1 
issues upon which the case was tried, even thou~! 
such issues were not stated in the pleading~ a' 
originally drawn. In such case it is the duty of th" 
court, after the evidence upon the supposed is~u· 
has been introduced without objection, to perrni: 
the amendment. . . . This rule, hou;crcr, duc.s 1w: 
authorize such an amendment 1ncrely bccau8c cc· 
dence which is competrnt and 11iaterial upo11 fir 
issitcs created by the pleadings incidentally fr/Iii· 
to pru'i.:e another fact 11ut il·ithin the issues i11 111 
case." (Emphasis ours) 
See also the languagP of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in the case of 8rars, Roebuck & Co. r. M~r: 
henkc, 121 F.2d 598, where a plaintiff, after having trite 
his case on a negligence theory attempted to anll'Ill' 
21 
,, 11wl11d1· a thl·ory of bread1 of warranty. Haid the 
I \I \l J"1 : 
"l:otli pll·adings and findings an• t•ntireh con-
:--ic-t\·llt \\·ith tlH• position nmintaim•d by the ·appd-
11·1· in hi=- prineipal brief that 'the aetion is not one 
l or an i111plie<l \\'arranty ... but tht> c0111plaint and 
[ 1ndi11µ:;-; of fact ... presPn t a case of nt>gligPIH'l' • 
1·t1·. and altogPtht•r ineonsi:.;tPnt with tlw tlworv 
111' lial1ility for br<>aeh of an i111pliP<l warranty ad-
\ a11(·\·d in tlw supplementary brief. This is not 
a \'a.-.:1• in whieh issues not raised hy tht> plt>adings 
\\1·r(• tried by tht> 'expres.s or impli(•d consPnt of 
t lw part i(•s · arnl Hule 15 ( b) ... ha.s tlH•rpfon• no 
appli<·ation. The• case was tried as one for nPgli-
g·(·!l<'<' in a<'conlancP with the issues made by the 
plPadings. 
"\\.h('tlwr tht• evidence offered would have sup-
J>lirh·d a j11<lg11wnt for breach of an implied war-
ranty lmsPd upon other plt>adings and findings WP 
w·P<l not now d<>tennine. The present action must 
h treatl'<l as one for nPglig<'n<'.P only. lt is there-
! )I"\' umu•<·\·ssary to consider tlw argm1u•nt of eoun-
s\•l with rPfert>nce to the right of an infant to 
J'\'('1)\'1•r upon an i111plie<l warranty made to hi::; 
pan•nts." 
~('\· also tht· language of Hay ·z:. Nance, 119 F.Supp. 
~ li:J: 
".\ t tlw Pn•-trial t•onf<.n•nc·P, during tht• opPning 
c-tatPttH•nt of tlw dPf Pndant and through tlw trial, 
t 111· nttornPY for thP dPfrndant rPfrrn•d to thret' 
addition al < lPfrm;p:-; othN than thm:p plPaded: (a) 
n"g-lig-PTl<'P of plaintiff's hrn.;hand (h) plaintiff's 
<·<•n,.;11111ption of liquor and (c) suddPn PmPrgPncy, 
\\ lii<·lt ha<1 not pr<'vionsly lw<'n raisrd in the> plead-
ing-:-: and to sueh injPction into the case, proper 
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objection wm; ma<le by eounsel for thP plaintill 
Moreover, proof establishing sueh <lefrnsPs \\.: irnm~fieie~t. '.l'herefore l find that, t•vc•n \\ itli 11'11, ~mehoratmg mfluence of Hule 13 ( b) ... tlH· l'<iur: 
18 precluded from eonsidPring tht>se <ldt>n:-;i·~ 
For Hule 15(b) has no application unless isi;u1.: 
not raised by the pleadings are tried with th;. 
express or implied eonsent of the parties ... , ai1,1 
where evidence has been admitted over ohjPttii.! 
and the pleadings have not been amended, 11 , 
amendment can be implied. . . . And, of eom~· 
there must be at least proofs to support the l'iud 
ings if there is no underlying pleading." 
See also the language of the Supreme Court of Col11-
rado in the case of Clemann v. Bandinierc, 259 P.2d Gl-1. 
616: 
''Amendments such as here allowed should !J, 
granted after the close of the evidence only i1 
cases where no reasonable doubt remains tha: 
the issue raised by the amendment has been in 
tentionally and actually tried. It is not enou~1 
that some evidence has been received germane t 
the issue sought to be raised." 
Pursuant to Rule 16, the court conducted a pretria. 
which specifically limited the issues for trial, and pn· 
vided that no amendments to the pleadings be perrnittt>C 
except '•for good cause shown." No good cause w~ 
shov.'11, or even attempted to be shown by counsel fo1 
plaintiff. 
In view of the foregoing considerations, it canmr 
be said that the trial judge abused his discretion in deny 
ing plaintiff's untimely motion for leave to amend. 
I 11d1·r 1 '()i11t 111 01' hi~ 1,ri1·f, plaintiff :'l'l'k:.; to 
•
1
11.tk 11111:-<t1H·1· \\·1th wilful rni~1·01Hlul't. Ill' has eitl'd 
, 1,, ;:11:l111rity for thi:-: proposition, a;-'~Ullwdly for thl' 
.. ;1,,111 that tlt1·n· is nonl'. ln th1· absl'IH'l' of supporting 
:11Jtl11111t:- !'or plaintiff'~ po~ition, Wl' Sl'P no nl'L'<l to 
11<'!11·i11:-::ak tli1· ol>Yious-that nui:-:am·p an<l wilful rnis-
·1i11il11t·: an· 1·ntin·ly uifft:l'l'nt ('()Jl('(•pt~, with uiffrring 
"..:" 1 1111·id1·11b and eoBsl'![lll'lH't•s. \Y 1· make this obsl'r\"a-
1 11. 111 ii.' :-:u that the c·ourt uiay know that Wl' <lo not, 
1.1 ,.il1·111·1·, a1·quiesee in plaintiff's eontPntion. 
COXCLVSlOX 
1·1t~·n· \nu; no e\'iuence in the record whieh would 
'"l'['\llt 1l rinding of wilful rniseonduet upon tht· part 
"' tlt1• d1·f1·1Hla11t. Plaintiff's motion for leave to anwnd 
.1 :1:- u11tirn1·ly fih·d and the court did not abuse its dis-
' r1·t 11111 in d1·11yi11g th1· motion. The judgrnl'nt of the trial 
1·1111rt :-lwuld be affirmed. 
H1•sp1•rtfully sulnnittPd, 
CHHI8TI•:~SEX A~D .H~XSE~ 
Attorneys for defendants and 
respondents 
1 ~U3 ContinPntal Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, l"tah 
